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We analyze ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and the nominal exchange rate
under optimal monetary policy with local currency pricing by developing
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models. We estimate our models using Bayesian techniques with Japanese
and US data, and calculate impulse response functions. Our estimation
results show that local currency pricing is strongly supported against pro-
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viewpoint of minimizing welfare costs and that completely stabilizing con-
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What kind of inﬂation rate should be stabilized from the viewpoint of mini-
mizing welfare costs? Which exchange rate regime should be chosen from that
viewpoint? These are important questions when discussing optimal monetary
policy in an open economy. This paper shows that consumer price index (CPI)
inﬂation should be stabilized if we assume that prices are set in the consumers’
currency (denoted local currency pricing, LCP). In addition, we show that stabi-
lizing the CPI inﬂation rate is not inconsistent with a ﬁxed exchange rate under
LCP. Our ﬁnding contrasts with previous papers discussing optimal monetary
policy using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models because
those papers show that the producer price index (PPI) inﬂation rate should
be stabilized from that viewpoint even if an open economy is assumed.1 Gali
and Monacelli [12] show that optimal monetary policy in a small open economy
is consistent with PPI inﬂation targeting.2 Although not mentioned explicitly,
they assume that prices are set in the producers’ currency (denoted producer
currency pricing, PCP). They compare three policy regimes, PPI inﬂation-based
and CPI inﬂation-based Taylor rules and a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, and show
that of these three regimes a PPI inﬂation-based Taylor rule produces macroe-
conomic volatility closest to that brought about by optimal monetary policy.
In addition, their policy implications suggest that the optimal monetary pol-
icy outcome is not fundamentally diﬀerent from the closed economy outcome.
While they do not highlight ﬁrms’ price-setting behavior, Gali and Monacelli
[12] imply that PPI inﬂation targeting is optimal under PCP. Developing a two-
country model, Benigno and Benigno [2] show implicitly that stabilizing PPI
inﬂation minimizes welfare costs under PCP.
Reﬂecting on LCP, which cannot be ignored because of supporting empiri-
cal evidence, some studies in the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)
literature and DSGE literature focus on LCP to discuss monetary policy. Intro-
ducing importers adopting LCP into Gali and Monacelli’s [12] model, Monacelli
[25] shows that the law of one price (LOOP) gap resembles a cost-push shock
to the New Keynesian Philips Curve (NKPC) and implies that inﬂation—output
gap tradeoﬀs cannot be dissolved by optimal monetary policy, although Gali
and Monacelli [12] suggest that those tradeoﬀs can be dissolved. Because of the
appearance of a LOOP gap in the NKPC, he emphasizes that optimal mone-
tary policy stabilizes the LOOP gap.3 Devereux, Lane and Xu [6] show that
CPI price stability maximizes households’ utility, rather than nontradable goods
price stability and a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, in a model in which external
shocks aﬀect an emerging market via changes in interest rates and the terms of
trade (TOT) by introducing ﬁnancial frictions, a nontraded goods sector and
importers adopting LCP. Devereux and Engel [5] show that a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime minimizes welfare costs with their two-country model with LCP
ﬁrms. While Devereux, Lane and Xu [6] consider a targeted inﬂation rate, De-
vereux and Engel [5] consider a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. In addition, only
1In many DSGE studies, there is no distinction between the deﬁnitions of PPI inﬂation,
domestic inﬂation and GDP inﬂation.
2Gali and Monacelli [12] term the Taylor rule which includes PPI inﬂation a domestic
inﬂation-based Taylor rule rather than a PPI inﬂation-based Taylor rule. However, their
deﬁnition of domestic inﬂation is consistent with our deﬁnition of PPI inﬂation.
3Note that Monacelli [25] does not analyze optimal monetary policy explicitly.
1Devereux and Engel [5] discuss optimal monetary policy explicitly. Hence, the
type of inﬂation rate that should be stabilized from the viewpoint of minimiz-
ing welfare costs and the relationship between the exchange rate regime and
optimal monetary policy is ambiguous.4 Focusing on policy tradeoﬀsb e t w e e n
stabilization of the prices of domestically produced goods and stabilization of
the prices of imported goods, Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [3] show that CPI
stabilization is optimal from the viewpoint of maximizing households’ utility.
Their LCP model is quite sophisticated, because they introduce both upstream
and downstream ﬁrms to generate policy tradeoﬀs between stabilization of the
prices of domestically produced goods and stabilization of the prices of imported
goods. They compare various policy regimes and show that strict CPI inﬂation
targeting is close to optimal monetary policy in its eﬀect on the volatility of the
CPI inﬂation rate and real GDP. This result suggests that CPI stabilization is
optimal from the viewpoint of minimizing welfare costs under LCP. However,
they imply that complete stabilization in the nominal exchange rate is not con-
sistent with complete CPI stabilization.5 In addition, they do not clarify the
relationship between inﬂation and the output gap.
To identify the type of inﬂation rate that should be stabilized under LCP
and to clarify the relationship between the optimal targeted inﬂation rate and
the exchange rate regime, we develop an LCP model that assumes a two-country
setting at ﬁrst. In addition, to clarify what aﬀects diﬀerences in the policy im-
plications of LCP, we also develop a two-country model with PCP, following
studies such as Gali and Monacelli [12] and Benigno and Benigno [2]. We esti-
mate both models with a plausible interest rate feedback rule adopting Bayesian
techniques as in Smets and Wouters [31], Adjemian, Darracq-Paries and Smets
[1] and Rabanal and Tuesta [29] using Japanese and US data, and compare the
plausibility of the two models. Well-microfounded loss functions under both
LCP and PCP are derived from a second-order Taylor expanded utility func-
tion following Woodford [34] and Gali [11]. We derive optimality conditions for
central banks that minimize microfounded loss functions and simulate the LCP
and PCP models with estimated posterior parameters.
Our estimation results for the PCP and LCP models are consistent with
previous papers. Following Kass and Raftery [19] and Jeﬀreys [17] by comparing
the LCP and PCP models, we ﬁnd that the LCP model is more plausible than
the PCP model. This ﬁnding is consistent with Engel and Rogers [7], Goldberg
and Knetter [13] and Frankel, Parseley and Wei [9], who show that LCP is
dominant. 6
Our most important result is that optimal monetary policy under LCP pro-
duces no ﬂuctuations in the CPI inﬂation rate. The PPI inﬂation rate is not
stabilized under LCP. Roughly speaking, optimal monetary policy under LCP is
CPI inﬂation targeting. This result is quite diﬀerent from the result in Gali and
Monacelli [12]. Our result is conﬁrmed by the IRFs, volatility in the CPI inﬂa-
tion and the loss function stemming from a second-order approximated utility
4In fact, Devereux and Engel [5] do not discuss ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate under
a ﬁxed exchange rate that minimize welfare costs under the LCP, and Devereux, Lane and
Xu [6] imply that there is a tradeoﬀ between CPI stabilization and nominal exchange rate
stabilization.
5In fact, they state that complete CPI stabilization may not be desirable.
6Engel and Rogers [7], Goldberg and Knetter [13] and Frankel, Parseley and Wei [9] report
a high degree of stability in import prices in the local currency.
2function. Interestingly, the quadratic terms of CPI inﬂa t i o na p p e a ri no u rl o s s
function and replace the quadratic terms of PPI inﬂation under LCP, although
the quadratic terms of PPI inﬂation appear in our loss function under PCP as
in Gali and Monacelli [12] and Benigno and Benigno [2].
Our result that there are no ﬂuctuations in the nominal exchange rate under
LCP is consistent with Devereux and Engel [5]. Another result, that there are
no ﬂuctuations in CPI inﬂation under LCP, is consistent with Corsetti, Dedola
and Leduc [3]. Summarizing our results, optimal monetary policy under LCP is
not only consistent with CPI inﬂation targeting but also consistent with a ﬁxed
exchange rate. Hence, it can be said that we reconcile with Devereux and Engel
[5], who show that a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei so p t i m a l ,a n dw i t hC o r s e t t i ,
Dedola and Leduc [3], who show that CPI stabilization is optimal and there
is a strong stabilization tradeoﬀ between the nominal exchange rate and CPI
inﬂation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the LCP
and PCP models. Section 3 estimates the LCP and PCP models using Bayesian
techniques. Section 4 analyzes optimal mone t a r yp o l i c yb yd e r i v i n gw e l f a r ec o s t s
and FONCs for central banks, and simulates the models. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 The Model
We construct a two-country model belonging to the class of DSGE models with
nominal rigidities and imperfect competition, basically following Gali and Mona-
celli [12] and Monacelli [25]. We extend Gali and Monacelli’s [12] small open
economy model to develop a two-country economy model following Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ [27], although we assume all goods are tradable. The economy consists
of two symmetric countries, H and F.C o u n t r yH produces an array of diﬀer-
entiated goods indexed by the interval h ∈ [0,1], while country F produces an
array of diﬀerentiated goods indexed by f ∈ [1,2]. In addition, we derive two
models; one of them adopts LCP, while the other adopts PCP.




if there are no provisions, where Vt denotes
an arbitrary variable and V denotes the steady state value of Vt.
2.1 LCP Model
Under LCP, the LOOP does not necessarily hold because ﬁrms can choose
the prices at which to sell goods in countries H and F separately. Thus,
Pt (h)=EtP∗
t (h)a n dPt (f)=EtP∗
t (f) hence PH,t = EtP∗
H,t and PF,t =
EtP ∗
F,t do not necessarily hold where Pt (h)a n dPt (f)d e n o t et h ep r i c eo fa












denote indices of the
prices of generic goods produced in countries H and F, respectively, Et de-
notes the nominal exchange rate and ε > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution
across goods.7 Note that quantities and prices particular to country F are de-
noted by asterisks, while quantities and prices without asterisks are those in
country H.
7By citing Betts and Devereux [4], Mark [23] explains LCP clearly.
32.1.1 Households











t denotes the period utility, Et denotes the
expectation, conditional on the information set at period t, β ∈ (0,1) denotes the
subjective discount factor, Ct denotes consumption, Nt ≡
R 1
0 Nt (h)dh denotes
hours of work, σ denotes the degree of relative risk aversion and ϕ denotes
the inverse of the labor supply elasticity. The preferences of the representative
h o u s e h o l di nc o u n t r yF are deﬁned analogously.






































Dixit—Stiglitz-type indices of goods produced in countries H and F, respectively,
and η > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in
countries H and F. Note that C∗
t is deﬁned analogously to Eq. (2).
Total consumption expenditure by households in country H is given by
PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t = PtCt. A sequence of budget constraints in country H is
given by:
Bt + WtNt − Tt ≥ PtCt +E t (Qt,t+1Bt+1), (3)
where Qt,t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor, Bt denotes the nominal
payoﬀ of the bond portfolio purchased by households, Wt denotes the nominal

















denotes the CPI. P ∗
t is deﬁned analogously to this equation. Log-linearizing
this equality yields pt = 1








where πt ≡ pt − pt−1 denotes CPI inﬂation with πH,t = pH,t − pH,t−1 and
πF,t = pF,t − pF,t−1.
The optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each category of







































































The representative household maximizes Eq. (1) subject to Eq. (3). The



















which is a standard intratemporal optimality condition where Rt ≡ 1+rt satis-
fying R
−1
t =E tQt,t+1 denotes the gross nominal return on a riskless one-period
discount bond paying oﬀ one unit of the common currency (in short, the gross
nominal interest rate), and rt denotes the net nominal interest rate. Eq. (8) is
an intertemporal optimality condition, namely the Euler equation, and Eq. (9)
is an intratemporal optimality condition. Optimality conditions in country F
are given analogously.
Log-linearizing Eq. (8), we obtain:












There is an uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) relationship for the gross










t. Log-linearizing the UIP, we have the following familiar
expression:
Et (∆et+1)=ˆ rt − ˆ r∗
t,





Combining Eq. (8) and UIP and iterating with an initial condition, we have









Pt denoting the real exchange rate and ϑ denoting a constant






5Our setting is deﬁnitely diﬀerent from Betts and Devereux [4], who introduce
pricing-to-market behavior that is consistent with LCP in our deﬁnition into
the Redux model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [26]. Although Betts and
Devereux [4] and this paper allow violations of the LOOP, purchasing power
parity (PPP) holds in this paper ex post, although PPP does not necessarily
hold in their paper. While we assume an international risk-sharing condition
as shown in Eq. (11), Betts and Devereux [4] introduce restrictions in asset
availability, which inhibits international optimal risk sharing.8 Because of their
setting, Eq. (11) is no longer applied, hence PPP is not necessarily applied.
In addition, this implies that violation of PPP does not stem from LCP. We
further discuss the relationship between the LOOP and PPP under LCP in
Section 2.1.3.
2.1.2 Market Clearing
The market for goods in country H satisﬁes the market clearing condition when
domestic demand equals domestic supply, as follows:
Yt (h)=Ct (h)+C∗
t (h), (12)
where Yt (h) denotes the output of good h. The market clearing condition in


































represent the index of aggregate output in












































by combining Eq. (13) and the Dixit—Stiglitz aggregators for output and prices,
where we substitute the optimal risk sharing condition into the ﬁrst equality in
Eq.(14) to derive the second line in Eq. (14).






where St is the foreign TOT. The numerator is the export price of goods pro-
d u c e di nc o u n t r yF in terms of country H’s currency and the denominator is the
export price of goods produced in country F in terms of country H’s currency.
Log-linearizing Eq. (15), we have:
st = pF,t − et − p∗
H,t, (16)
8Although they develop a two-country model that consists of a home and a foreign country,
internationally tradable assets are denominated in the home country’s currency.
6where st ≡ lnSt.
By log-linearizing Eq. (14), we have:












which is log-linearized market clearing in country H under LCP. There is a
diﬀerence between this equality and Eq. (42) because the logarithmic real ex-
change rate qt appears in this equality. However, this equality is equivalent to
Eq. (42) because PPP holds, which implies that qt = 0, although we assume
LCP.
Combining log-linearized market clearing in country H and its counterpart






which clariﬁes the relationship between the TOT and relative output under LCP.
As mentioned, qt = 0 holds, although we assume LCP. Hence, this equality is
equivalent to Eq. (41).
2.1.3 Firms
Each producer uses a linear technology to produce a diﬀerentiated good as
follows:
Yt (h)=AtNt (h), (17)
where At denotes stochastic productivity in country H. Firms in country F have
a technology analogous to that of ﬁrms in country H. The percentage deviation
of productivity from its steady state value in countries H and F follows AR(1)
processes at = ρat−1+ξt and a∗
t = ρa∗
t−1+ξ∗
t with ξt and ξ∗
t being i.i.d. shocks.













this equality is given by:
yt = at + nt, (19)
which is consistent with Gali and Monacelli’s [12] log-linearized production func-
tion.
Following many DSGE studies including Gali and Monacelli [12], we assume
that ﬁrms set prices using Calvo—Yun-style price-setting behavior. Hence, 1−θ
ﬁrms set new prices in each period, with an individual ﬁrm’s probability of re-
optimizing in any given period being independent of the time elapsed since it last
set its prices. Each producer produces a single diﬀerentiated good and prices
its good to reﬂect the elasticity of substitution across goods produced given
t h eC P I .T h i si sb e c a u s ee a c hﬁrm plays an active part in the monopolistically
competitive market. In addition, we assume that ﬁrms have the ability to
7engage in price discrimination by setting a domestic price in terms of domestic
currency for domestic sales that diﬀers from the price that it sets for exports.
This is LCP behavior. Under Calvo—Yun-style price-setting behavior and LCP
behavior in a monopolistically competitive market, the maximization problems
faced by producers in country H are as follows:
max


















































where ˜ PH,t and ˜ P ∗
H,t are the prices chosen by ﬁrms when they have an opportu-
nity to change the prices of goods produced and sold in country H and goods
produced in country H a n ds o l di nc o u n t r yF, respectively, MCn
t ≡ PP,tMCt
denotes nominal marginal costs in country H,a n dMCt ≡
(1−τ)Wt
AtPP,t and PP,t








which can be rewritten as PP,t = PH,t when the LOOP holds. The PPI in




















where πP,t denotes the PPI inﬂation rate in country H, πH,t ≡ pH,t − pH,t−1




H,t−1 denotes the inﬂation rate of goods produced in country H and
sold in country F, respectively and πPt = πH,t holds when the LOOP holds.
Note that the maximization problems that producers in country F face are
analogous to Eq. (20). Because of nominal rigidities, Eq. (20) looks com-














which implies that each ﬁrm sets its price in terms of the local currency in which
each ﬁrm’s good is sold and pays costs to produce in terms of the producer’s
currency. Under LCP, we have multiple FONCs because ﬁrms can choose ˜ PH,t
and ˜ P ∗






































8which can be log-linearized as follows:





















with ζ ≡ θ







Pt+k.F O N C sf o rﬁrms imply that ﬁrms set the price as a markup
over a weighted average of expected future marginal costs. In particular, the ﬁrst
equality in Eq. (22) corresponds to the one derived by Gali and Monacelli [12].
The second equality in Eq. (22) is not a familiar expression, although it implies
that ﬁrms set the price as a markup over a weighted average of expected future
nominal marginal costs. The second equality in Eq. (22) is the log-linearized
FONC for ﬁrms that produce goods in country H a n ds e l lt h e mi nc o u n t r yF.
Those ﬁrms set the price in terms of country F’s currency as a markup over a
weighted average of expected future nominal marginal costs in terms of country
F’s currency. Next, we examine Eq. (22) after ﬁrst discussing some identities
including the relative prices peculiar to LCP behavior.
Under LCP, the LOOP does not necessarily hold because of Eqs. (20) and
(22), which imply that ﬁrms set the prices of their goods in terms of the local
currency, namely LCP. Because of this, there is a LOOP gap, which measures the
degree of pass-through. Now, we discuss the LOOP gap and the real exchange











where ΨH,t and ΨF,t denote the LOOP gap for goods produced in countries H
and F, respectively. When the LOOP holds, we have ΨH,t = ΨF,t =1 .
















which implies that the LOOP gap is a function of the TOT, the real ex-










= ΨH,tΨF,t, that equality can be rewritten as follows:
Qt =1 ,
which implies that PPP holds, although the LOOP does not hold.9 The log-
linearized version of this equality is as follows:
qt =0 . (23)
9This equality implies that the marginal utility of consumption in country H is identical
to that in country F. Hence, the UIP can be derived by simply combining Eq.8 and its
counterpart in country F, although we describe that we assume the UIP in Section 2.1.1.
9In addition, substituting Eq. (23) into Eq. (11), we have ct = c∗
t, which implies
that the marginal utilities of consumption in the two countries are equal. In fact,
households in both countries consume the same goods, although there is price
discrimination. As mentioned, the LOOP does not necessarily hold, although
Eq. (23) implies that the PPP is deﬁnitely applied. This sounds inconsistent
at a glance. However, although the price of one good violates the LOOP, PPP
holds when another good violates the LOOP inversely. In fact, substituting
Qt = 1 into that equality, we have ΨH,t = Ψ
−1
F,t and the log-linearized version
of this as follows:
ψH,t = −ψF,t,
which implies that gains from price discrimination correspond to losses from
price discrimination.
The log-linearized market clearing conditions in countries H and F clarify
the relationship between the nominal exchange rate, price level and TOT. Sub-
stituting the log-linearized deﬁnition of the CPI into the log-linearized market
clearing conditions yields:
et = pt − p∗
t
= pP,t − p∗
P,t + st,






where we use the log-linearized deﬁnition of PPI to derive the second line and
Eq. (41) to derive the third line. Eq. (24) implies that the output diﬀerential
between both countries aﬀects the nominal exchange rate.
In turn, we examine Eq. (22), the log-linearized FONCs for ﬁrms under LCP.
Using the deﬁnition of the LOOP gap, Eq. (22) can be rewritten as follows:






































k Et (mct+k). (25)
As mentioned, ﬁrms set the price as a markup over a weighted average of future
marginal cost. In our LCP setting, those ﬁrms’ sales are not measured by the
PPI, because it is the weighted average of the prices of goods selling in both
country H and country F. However, real marginal cost is measured by the PPI,
as shown in the deﬁnition of nominal marginal cost. That is, those ﬁrms obtain
sales of PH,t and pay total costs of PP,t and the gap is pP,t−pH,t = 1
2ψH,t,w h i c h
implies that the gap corresponds to the LOOP gap in country H. Although
the ﬁrms selling goods in country H have no currency disparity in sales and
payments, LCP behavior generates the LOOP gap. Thus, a weighted average
10of the expected future LOOP gap in country H appears in the ﬁrst equality in
Eq. (25).
The price-setting behavior of the ﬁrms selling goods in country F generates
the LOOP gap, as does the behavior of ﬁr m st h a ts e l lg o o d si nc o u n t r yH.
These exporters obtain their revenue from the sale of goods exported in terms
of country F’s currency and pay total costs in terms of country H’s currency.
Their sales are measured in terms of country H’s currency. Hence, their sales
in terms of country F’s currency are multiplied by the nominal exchange rate.
They pay total costs measured by the PPI, as do the ﬁr m ss e l l i n gg o o d si n






2ψH,t.T h u s , a
weighted average of the expected future LOOP gap in country H appears in the
second equality in Eq. (25), although the sign is contrary to the ﬁrst equality.
A similar mechanism works in ﬁrms in country F, not only for selling goods
domestically but also for exporters. Although our LCP setting is diﬀerent from
Monacelli [25], who assumes a small open economy and importers, our LCP
setting clearly generates the LOOP gap, and this setting aﬀects the nature of
the New Keynesian Philips Curve (NKPC) and the amount of social welfare
stemming from a second-order approximated utility function.
2.1.4 Marginal Cost and Natural Rate of Output
Substituting Eq. (9) into the deﬁnition of marginal cost, we obtain:











which is log-linearized as follows:
mct = σct + ϕnt +
1
2
st − at, (27)
which is consistent with Gali and Monacelli’s [12] log-linearized marginal cost.
Under the ﬂexible price equilibrium, MCt = 1
ζ, implying that the real
marginal cost is constant and corresponds to the inverse of a constant markup.
Using this fact and combining Eqs. (14), (18) and Eq. (26), we have the natural





































where ¯ Yt denotes the natural rate of output in country H, which implies that
the natural rate of output is a function not only of productivity but also of
relative prices because of the open economy setting.
Before log-linearizing this equality, we deﬁne the output gap in country H
xt as the percentage deviation of output in country Hy t from its natural level
¯ yt. This relationship can be written as:
xt ≡ yt − ¯ yt, (28)
which is consistent with Gali and Monacelli’s [12] deﬁnition. The output gap in
country F is deﬁned analogously to Eq. (28).
11Next, we log-linearize that equality. The log-linearized natural rate of output









where ω1 ≡ η (σ +2 ϕ)+1 ,ω2 ≡ 2η (1 + ϕ)a n dω3 ≡ ω2
1 − (ση − 1)
2.W h e r e a s
Gali and Monacelli [12] regard foreign output as exogenous because of their
small open economy setting, foreign output, namely output in country F,i s
endogenous in our two-country setting. Thus, productivity in country F replaces
f o r e i g no u t p u ti nE q .( 2 9 ) .
Next, we consider Eq. (27), which shows the percentage deviation of marginal










which implies that real marginal cost in country H is the sum of the output gap
in the two countries.
2.1.5 The Demand and Supply Sides
Substituting log-linearized market clearing and Eqs. (28) and (29) into Eq. (10)
yields the New Keynesian IS Curve (NKIS) as follows:























t denotes the natural rate
of interest in country H with σα ≡ ση+1,ω4 ≡ ω1 −
(ση−1)
2
σα and ω5 ≡ ω1
σα −1.
T h eN K I Si nc o u n t r yF, which is analogous to Eq. (31), can be derived using
the counterparts of Eqs. (10), (28) and (29).
Eq. (31) looks like an ordinary NKIS in the DSGE literature at a glance,
however, because of LCP, Eq. (31) has some distinguishing features. Substitut-
ing Eq. (21) into Eq. (31), NKIS under LCP can be rewritten as follows:




























































where we use log-linearized UIP to derive the second line. As shown in the
ﬁrst line, changes in the expected nominal exchange rate aﬀect the NKIS. The
second line shows that not only the domestic nominal interest rate but also the
foreign nominal interest rate appears in the NKIS.
12Substituting the log-linearized Calvo’s pricing rule and Eq. (30) into Eq.
(25), we have equalities that determine the dynamics of inﬂation as follows:






























θ .T h e ﬁrst equality is the inﬂation dynamics for goods
sold domestically and the second equality is the inﬂation dynamics for goods
exported. Because Eq. (33) is derived from Eq. (25), the FONCs for ﬁrms
in country H, the third and fourth terms on the RHS that stem from the real
marginal cost in country H, are consistent between the equalities. The signs
of the second terms on the RHS are opposite in the two equalities. The reason
is that the losses from price discrimination are compensated by the gains from
price discrimination, and vice versa. The counterpart of Eq. (33) is derived
from the counterpart of Eq. (25).
Substituting Eq. (33) into Eq. (21), we have the New Keynesian Philips
Curve (NKPC) in country H as follows:














and substituting the counterpart of Eq. (33) into Eq. (21) yields the coun-
terpart of this equality in country F. This NKPC features the appearance of
changes in the nominal exchange rate. Gali and Monacelli [12] mention that full
stabilization of domestic prices coincides with full stabilization of the output
gap, namely xt = πH,t =0f o ra l lt. In our model, their domestic prices corre-
spond to the PPI and they assume fully exogenous foreign output, which implies
that the percentage deviation of marginal cost from its steady state value is not
aﬀected by the percentage deviation of foreign output from its steady state
value. That is, they claim that full stabilization of PPI implies that output is
at its natural rate if we ignore the foreign output gap or assume ση = 1 in this
equality. Even if we ignore the foreign output gap or assume ση = 1 in this
equality, full stabilization of PPI does not necessarily imply that output is at
its natural rate because of changes in the nominal exchange rate, as shown in
the fourth and ﬁfth terms on the RHS. Changes in the nominal exchange rate
act as cost-push shocks under LCP. Thus, full stabilization of PPI no longer
implies that output is at its natural rate if we ignore the foreign output gap or
assume ση = 1. Substituting Eqs. (24), (29) and (28) into that equality, we can
eliminate changes in the nominal exchange rate and obtain:
































η , κς ≡
1+β−λ(ση−1)
η , ω6 ≡
ω2$3(σ+ϕ)
ω3 and $3 ≡ 1+β (1 − ρ).
Exogenous shocks appear in Eq. (34), which shows that exogenous productivity
aﬀects PPI inﬂation.
13Monacelli [25] derives a CPI-based NKPC. Following Monacelli [25], we de-
rive a CPI-based NKPC. Substituting the ﬁrst equality in Eq. (33) and its
counterpart in country F into Eq. (5) yields:








with κα ≡ λ(σ + ϕ). As mentioned by Gali and Monacelli [12], κα is consistent
with the slope coeﬃcient for a standard closed economy NKPC. Full stabi-
lization of CPI inﬂation rather than PPI inﬂation implies that output is at its
natural rate when the nominal interest rate in both countries absorbs the eﬀects
of changes in productivity in NKISs. Gali and Monacelli [12] demonstrate that
a full stabilization of PPI inﬂa t i o ni m p l i e st h a to u t p u ti sa ti t sn a t u r a ll e v e la n d
there is no output gap in their non-LCP setting in a small open economy, as
mentioned. However, our CPI-based NKPC Eq. (35) implies that full stabiliza-
tion of CPI inﬂation implies that output is at its natural level and there is no
output gap in our LCP setting in a two-country model. This can be understood
alternatively and intuitively by comparing Eqs. (5) and (21). To derive Eq.
(34), we use Eq. (21) implying that PPI inﬂation is aﬀected by changes in the
nominal exchange rate, while we use Eq. (5) to derive Eq. (35).
In addition, Eq. (35) contrasts with the CPI-based NKPC in Monacelli [25].
In his LCP setting, importers purchase foreign goods in terms of foreign currency
while they sell foreign goods in terms of domestic currency. Because importers
maximize their proﬁts, the LOOP gap appears in the CPI-based NKPC in
Monacelli [25]. Our LCP setting is quite diﬀerent from Monacelli’s [25] setting.
Goods markets are fully partitioned, so there are no importers and each producer
prices their goods in terms of consumers’ currency. As mentioned in Section
2.1.3, the LOOP gap does not appear in Eq. (35), in contrast with Monacelli
[25].
2.2 PCP Model
Under PCP, the LOOP holds, which is given by Pt (h)=EtP ∗




H,t ; PF,t = EtP ∗
F,t (36)
and
pH,t = et + p∗




The preferences of the representative household, the private consumption index,
the optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each category of goods
and the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and foreign goods
are given by Eqs. (1), (2), (6) and (7), as in the LCP model. Because house-
holds face the same optimization problem, the intertemporal and intratemporal
optimality conditions are given by Eqs. (8) and (9). UIP holds in the PCP
model, hence the optimal risk-sharing condition holds in the PCP model. The
log-linearized deﬁnition of the CPI, the intertemporal optimality condition and
the risk-sharing condition are given by Eqs. (5), (10) and (11).
142.2.2 Market Clearing
The market clearing condition is given by Eq. (12) as in the LCP model.
Substituting Eqs. (6) and (7) into Eq.(12), we obtain Eq. (13). Because of the


















which is a demand function consistent with that of Benigno and Benigno [2].10






which is only applicable to the PCP model because Eq. (36) is not applicable
to the LCP model.
Log-linearizing Eq. (39), we have:
st = pF,t − pH,t. (40)
Eq. (40) is only applicable to the PCP model because Eq. (37) does not hold
under LCP, as is true for Eq. (39).






which clariﬁes the relationship between the TOT and relative output under
PCP. Gali and Monacelli [12] and Benigno and Benigno [2], who assume PCP,
d e r i v et h es a m ee q u a l i t y .




st + ct, (42)
where we use Eq. (37). As mentioned, Eq. (42) is the ﬁnal form of log-
linearized market clearing under LCP in country H. The diﬀerence in price-
setting behavior between LCP and PCP does not aﬀect market clearing.
2.2.3 Firms
Firms’ technology is given by Eq. (17), which can be rewritten as Eq. (18).
Thus, log-linearized technology is given by Eq. (19) as in the LCP model.
10We do not include government expenditure. Thus, government expenditure does not
appear in the equalities, although it appears in Benigno and Benigno [2].
15We assume Calvo—Yun-style price-setting behavior as in the LCP model.
However, the maximization problem faced by ﬁrms under PCP is quite simple.
Because of ˜ PH,t = Et ˜ P∗





























which is common in studies assuming Calvo pricing. Substituting Eq. (36) into
the deﬁnition of the PPI, we have PP,t = PH,t, and substituting Eq. (37) into
Eq. (21) yields:
πP,t = πH,t. (44)




















which is a familiar expression in studies assuming PCP. Log-linearizing this
equality, we have:










which corresponds to the ﬁrst equality in Eq. (22). The terms related to the
LOOP gap disappear, because the LOOP holds in the PCP model. This equality
can be rewritten as follows:








k Et (mct+k), (45)
which corresponds to one derived by Gali and Monacelli [12]. Because of the
LOOP, the LOOP gap disappears in Eq. (45), although the LOOP gap appears
in the ﬁrst equality in Eq. (25).
2.2.4 Marginal Cost and Natural Rate of Output
Substituting Eq. (9) into the deﬁnition of marginal cost, we obtain Eq. (26)
and its log-linearized equality Eq. (27). However, the natural rate of output
under PCP appears to be quite diﬀerent from that under LCP. Combining not



























16This equality is consistent with the log-linearized natural rate of output under
LCP in Eq. (29), although the natural rate of output is quite diﬀerent between
PCP and LCP before log-linearizing. This implies that diﬀerences in price-
s e t t i n gb e h a v i o rd on o ta ﬀect the natural rate of output.
The natural rate of output under PCP is consistent with the one under LCP,
implying the same relationship between marginal cost and the output gap. In









which is consistent with Eq. (30). The diﬀerence between the PCP and LCP
models is in the price-setting behavior. Because the marginal cost has no rela-
tionship with the price-setting behavior, Eq. (30) holds under both PCP and
LCP. Note that Gali and Monacelli [12] show that real marginal cost has a re-
lationship only with the domestic output gap, and their result is diﬀerent from
E q .( 3 0 ) .T h i s d i ﬀerence stems from our two-country setting. As mentioned,
foreign output is not exogenous in our setting, and productivity in country F
appears in Eq. (29), while foreign output appears in their expression in terms
of the percentage deviation from its steady state value. In their setting, for-
eign output rather than foreign productivity aﬀects the domestic natural rate
of output. The foreign output gap no longer aﬀects the domestic output gap,
which is determined by the percentage deviation of domestic real marginal cost
from its steady state value. Because the percentage deviation of domestic real
marginal cost from its steady state value corresponds to its deviation from its
ﬂexible price equilibrium value, the foreign output gap disappears in Gali and
Monacelli [12]. In fact, we have mct = ω1
2ηxt if we regard output in country F
as exogenous.
2.2.5 The Demand and Supply Sides
Substituting Eqs. (21), (23), (41) and (42) into Eq. (10) yields NKIS as follows:


















which is consistent with NKIS under LCP in Eq. (31). While the LOOP does
not hold in the LCP model, it holds in the PCP model. Hence, NKISs are not
the same in both models, although they are similar. Substituting Eq. (44) into
Eq. (46), we have:


















which is applicable only to the PCP model, and πH,t replaces πP,t in this equal-
ity. Because the LOOP holds in the PCP model, changes in neither the expected
nominal exchange rate nor the foreign nominal interest rate appear in NKIS un-
der PCP.
By rearranging Eq. (45), we have NKPC in country H under PCP as follows:








17which is the two-country version of NKPC derived by Gali and Monacelli [12].
While the foreign output gap appears in Eq. (47), it does not appear in the
NKPC derived by Gali and Monacelli [12], who assume a small open economy
where foreign variables are exogenous. Because our model is a two-country
model where the foreign variables are endogenous, the foreign output gap ap-
pears in our NKPC under PCP. In fact, if we regard output in country F as
exogenous, we have:




which is similar to the NKPC derived by Gali and Monacelli [12], and can be
derived alternatively if ση = 1 in our two-country model under PCP because
the foreign output gap disappears in such a case. Gali and Monacelli [12] show
that full stabilization of PPI implies that xt = πH,t = 0, which is plausible if the
output gap in country F disappears in Eq. (47). Because of our two-country
setting, the foreign output gap does not disappear as long as we do not assume
ση = 1. Hence, full stabilization of PPI does not necessarily imply xt = πH,t =0
in our two-country setting.
3E s t i m a t i o n
In this section, we estimate the LCP and PCP models with an interest rate
feedback rule using a Bayesian technique for Japanese and US data.
3.1 Interest Rate Feedback Rule
To estimate the LCP and PCP models, both models are closed by the following
interest rate feedback rule:
ˆ rt = %ˆ rt−1 +( 1− %)(φπt + φxxt)+mt, (48)
ˆ r∗
t = %∗ˆ r∗





where mt and m∗
t denote policy shifters in countries H and F, respectively, and





t with ζt and ζ∗
t being i.i.d. shocks.
3.2 Bayesian Estimation
There are many methods for estimating DSGE models. Since the seminal paper
of Kydland and Prescott [21], many studies have applied calibration methods,
in which the parameters are set to be consistent with the model in the steady
state. On the other hand, some researchers use the moments of their model to
estimate the deep parameters. One of the most popular of these methods is
the generalized method of moments (GMM). Furthermore, maximum likelihood
(ML) estimation has often been used, e.g., Sargent [30] and Ireland [16]. ML
estimation is a full-information analysis, because researchers need not only the
information of their model but also that of the stochastic process. Bayesian
estimation is also a full-information analysis. Instead of ML estimation, it takes
into account information about the parameters known to researchers prior to
18estimation. Recently, most researchers have used Bayesian methods, i.e., Smets
and Wouters [31] and Rabanal and Tuesta [29]. In this section, we estimate our
models using Bayesian methods.
Following Rabanal and Tuesta [29], we set the discount factor β equal to
0.995 so as to be consistent with the nominal rate of interest, two percent per
year in the steady state. To estimate the other parameters, we assume their prior
distribution as follows. The parameter of relative risk aversion, σ, the elasticity
of substitution between goods produced, η, the elasticity of labor supply, ϕ,t h e
reaction coeﬃcients to CPI inﬂation, φ and φ∗,a n dt h er e a c t i o nc o e ﬃcients to
the output gap, φx and φ∗
x, are all assumed to follow a normal distribution.
The parameter of price stickiness, θ, the interest rate inertia parameter in the
interest rate feedback rules, % and %∗,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcients of the AR(1) processes,
ρ, ρ∗, ρm,a n dρ∗
m, are all assumed to be distributed as a beta distribution. The
standard deviations of ξ, ξ∗, ζ and ζ∗ are assumed to follow an inverse gamma
distribution. For the parameter of the ﬁrst prior, we follow Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s
[28] estimation results, we follow Benigno and Benigno’s [2] setting based on
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s [28] estimation results for the parameter of the second
prior and we follow Gali and Monacelli’s [12] setting or Smets and Wouters’ [31]
s e t t i n gf o rt h eo t h e r s .T h e s ea s s u m p t i o n sa r es h o w ni nT a b l e1 .
We estimate the parameters using a Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method with these priors. The likelihood function of the observed data series
is evaluated by a Kalman ﬁlter. The posterior distribution of the parameters
is obtained through the Metropolis—Hastings algorithm. For the posterior dis-
tribution, 200,000 draws are created using the Metropolis—Hastings algorithm,
and the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e s ed r a w si sd i s c a r d e d .
3.3 Data
We estimate our models using Japan as country H and the United States as
country F. The data on real GDP, interest rates on government bonds, and
the CPI are from International Financial Statistics provided by the IMF. We
use quarterly observations for the period 1980:Q1 to 2008:Q4. The data on the
labor force are from the OECD Economic Outlook database.
To obtain the real per capita GDP gap series, we divide real GDP by the
labor force and apply the HP ﬁlter. As suggested by Hodrick and Prescott [14]
for quarterly data, we set the smoothing parameter to be 1600. We divide the
annual interest rate by four to get the quarterly interest rate. The ﬁrst diﬀerence
of the logarithmic CPI is used as the CPI inﬂation rate. All series, except for
interest rates, are seasonally adjusted using X12-ARIMA.
3.4 Results
Table 2 reports the posterior means and 90% credible intervals for the parame-
ters in both the LCP and PCP models. The mean of the relative risk aversion
parameter σ is estimated to be 4.440 in the LCP model and 2.518 in the PCP
model, respectively (the third row in Table 2). The value of σ in the PCP model
is similar to some studies, such as 2.045 in Levin et al. [22] and 2.041 in Iiboshi
et al. [15]. The estimates of the parameter for the inverse of the labor supply
elasticity ϕ are 2.389 in the LCP model and 5.737 in the PCP model (the ﬁfth
row in Table 2). The estimate of ϕ in the LCP model is close to those in Smets
19and Wouters [31], Iiboshi et al. [15] and Sugo and Ueda [32], who estimate this
parameter within the range 2.149 to 2.503. η is estimated to be 4.526 in the
LCP model and 8.174 in the PCP model (the fourth row in Table 2). The esti-
mate of η in the LCP model is close to Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [28], who estimate
it to be 4.5. The price-stickiness parameter θ is estimated to be 0.910 in the
LCP model and 0.909 in the PCP model. The estimates of the price-stickiness
parameter are close to the 0.875 for Japan reported in Sugo and Ueda[32] and
the 0.873 for the US in Adjemian et al. [1]. Therefore, our estimated results for
θ are plausible.
Regarding interest rate feedback rules, the coeﬃcients of the inﬂation rate
in country H φ are 1.264 in the LCP Model and 1.582 in the PCP Model (the
ninth row in Table 2). These results are similar to those in some Japanese
studies that estimate interest rate feedback rules such as Kimura and Tanemura
[20], Kamada and Muto [18] and Fujiwara et al. [10], who estimate the value
to range from 1.33 to 1.60 using Japanese data. For F φ∗,t h ec o e ﬃcients of
the inﬂation rate are estimated as 1.673 in the LCP model and 1.574 in the
PCP model (the 10th row in Table 2). These results are close to the results of
Mehra and Sawhney [24], who estimate the coeﬃcients of the inﬂation rate to
be 1.5 in the US. The coeﬃcients of the output gap in country H φx are 0.257
in the LCP model and 0.212 in the PCP model, which are larger than those
in Sugo and Ueda [32], who report this coeﬃcient to be 0.11 (the 11th row in
Table 2). In country F, φ∗
x is 0.087 in the LCP model and 0.170 in the PCP
model, which are larger than those in some studies for the US such as Smets
and Wouters [31] and Levin et al. [22] (the 12th row in Table 2). The results
for interest rate inertia in country H%are 0.647 in the LCP model and 0.321 in
the PCP model, which are less than those reported in Sugo and Ueda [32], who
estimate the inertia parameter to be 0.842 in Japan (the seventh row in Table
2). The interest rate inertia parameter in country F% ∗ is 0.539 in the LCP
model and 0.339 in the PCP model, which are smaller than those of the US,
which are 0.956 in Smets and Wouters [31] and 0.832 in Levin et al. [22] (the
eighth row in Table 2). The coeﬃcients of the AR(1) processes for productivity
ρ and ρ∗ are estimated to be between 0.440 and 0.735 in the LCP and PCP
models, respectively (the 13th and 14th rows in Table 2). These results do not
contradict the result in Gali and Monacelli [12], who report an AR(1) coeﬃcient
for productivity of 0.66.
Some estimation results are similar between the PCP model and the LCP
model. However, three deep parameters, σ, ϕ and η, are obviously diﬀerent
between the two models. While the result of σ in the PCP model is similar to
that of previous studies, the results for the other two deep parameters ϕ and η
in the LCP model are close to previous studies. Incidentally, in the LCP model,
the AR(1) coeﬃcient of productivity in country H ρ and that in country F
ρ∗ are similar to the results shown in Gali and Monacelli [12]. Furthermore,
because the interest rate inertia parameters % and %∗ of the LCP model are
larger than those of the PCP model, it can be said that the estimates of % and
%∗ in the LCP model, but not in the PCP model, somewhat reﬂect the results of
Sugo and Ueda [32], who mention that monetary policy has signiﬁcant inertia.
The LCP model may be plausible from the viewpoint of the estimation results.
We further discuss whether the LCP or PCP models are plausible in the next
subsection.
203.5 Model Comparison
In the previous section, we estimated the LCP and PCP models. Next, we
formally compare these models using Bayes factors. Denoting MLCP and MPCP
as the LCP and PCP models, respectively, and D as the data, the posterior odds









The second term on the right-hand side of this equation is called the Bayes
factor. As we do not have any information on which model is plausible, we set
the priors P(MLCP)a n dP(MPCP) equal to 0.5. In this case, the ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side is unity, so that the posterior odds ratio is equal to the
Bayes factor.
Following Kass and Raftery [19], we use three indices: the Bayes factor B,
2lnB and log10 B. Kass and Raftery [19] suggest that according to their values,
B and 2lnB are considered to be (i) not worth more than a bare mention,
(ii) positive, (iii) strong, and (iv) very strong. Furthermore, the criteria of
Jeﬀreys [17] are (i) not worth more than a bare mention, (ii) substantial, (iii)
strong, and (iv) decisive. We estimate the marginal likelihood using the Laplace
approximation and the modiﬁed harmonic mean.
The estimated Bayes factors are shown in Table 5, all of which have large
values. It suggests that the evidence in favor of MLCP is “very strong” (B>
150). The results of 2lnB are also the same as those for B,t h a ti s ,2 l n B of
greater than 10 means “very strong.” Furthermore, the values of log10 B being
greater than two are interpreted as “decisive.” Therefore, the LCP model is
strongly supported against the PCP model from the data, and this ﬁnding is
consistent with Engel and Rogers [7], Goldberg and Knetter [13] and Frankel,
Parseley and Wei [9], who show that the LCP model is dominant.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy under LCP and PCP
In this section, we discuss the properties of optimal monetary policy in the
LCP and PCP models. We derive microfounded period loss functions to obtain
optimality conditions for the central banks. We simulate the LCP and the
PCP models with optimality conditions, which replace the interest rate feedback
rule, to obtain impulse response functions, and discuss the properties of optimal
monetary policy in the LCP and PCP models.
4.1 Welfare Costs
We assume that each country has a central bank, and that these central banks
conduct optimal monetary policy. Central banks minimize welfare costs. Wel-
fare costs consist of the period loss function, which is derived from the welfare
criteria. Following Woodford [34] and Gali [11], we have a second-order approx-
imated utility function as follows:
WW
LCP = −LW


















loss function in LCP and PCP models, respectively, WW
LCP = 1




2 (WPCP + W∗
PCP) denote the average welfare criteria in the LCP
and PCP models, respectively, W W
LCP and W W
PCP denote the welfare criteria in
country H in the LCP and PCP models, respectively, with W ≡
P∞
t=0 E0 (Wt)
and Wt ≡ Ut−U





















































are period loss functions in countries H and F, respectively, zt ≡ st − ¯ st being




eﬃcient level of TOT. Note that we deﬁne vW
t ≡ 1
2 (vt + v∗
t)a n dvR
t ≡ vt − v∗
t.
Eqs. (51) and (52) imply that the role of central banks is minimizing ﬂuc-
tuations in the deviation of the TOT from its eﬃcient level zt and the average
output gap xW
t in the LCP and PCP models. On stabilizing inﬂation, the role
of central banks is diﬀerent between the LCP and PCP models. The quadratic
terms of the CPI inﬂation rate appears and replaces the quadratic terms of PPI
inﬂation in our loss function under LCP in Eq. (51), although the quadratic
terms of PPI inﬂation appear in our loss function under PCP in Eq. (52), as in
Gali and Monacelli [12] and Benigno and Benigno [2]. These facts imply that
the role of central banks is minimizing ﬂuctuations in the LCP model, while in
the PCP model their role is minimizing ﬂuctuations in PPI inﬂation.
4.2 FONCs for Central Banks
We next brieﬂyd i s c u s st h eF O N C sf o rt h ec e n t r a lb a n k s .W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
central bank in each country conducts cooperatively optimal monetary policy
with commitment. Under LCP, central banks minimize Eq. (51) and the FONCs











zt =0 . (54)
Because of commitment, lagged variables appear in the FONCs. Eqs. (53)
and (54) determine the equilibrium path of the output gap, CPI inﬂation and
the deviations of the TOT from its eﬃcient level in the LCP model along with
the structural model. Eq. (53) implies that there are no tradeoﬀs between the
output gap and inﬂation in an economy consisting of two countries under optimal
monetary policy. This implication is consistent with the outcome under the
assumption of a closed economy. Eq. (54) implies that full stabilization of the
deviation in the TOT from its eﬃcient level is optimal regardless of preferences
such as the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in countries H
and F η and the relative risk aversion σ.
















(zt − zt−1). (55)
22One of the FONCs is consistent with Eq. (53), and Eqs. (53) and (55) determine
the equilibrium path of the output gap, PPI inﬂation and the deviation of
the TOT from its eﬃcient level in the PCP model along with the structural
model. Because one of the FONCs is consistent with Eq. (53), there are no
tradeoﬀs between the output gap and inﬂation in the economy that consists of
two countries under optimal monetary policy. Eq. (55) does not show clear
implications of the tradeoﬀs between the output gap and inﬂation. However,
under the special case, the implications of Eq. (55) are clear. By substituting











which implies that inﬂation—output-gap tradeoﬀs are fully dissolved in each
country under optimal monetary policy when the elasticity of substitution be-
tween goods produced in countries H and F is unity.
4.3 Simulation
In this section, we simulate optimal monetary policy in the LCP and PCP
models. The optimality conditions for the central banks, Eqs. (53), (54) and
(55), replace the interest rate feedback rules Eqs. (48) and (49) in the LCP and
PCP models. Figure 1 shows the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation
increase in the productivity shock in country H, ξt, in the LCP model under
the parameters estimated in Section 3.4. Figure 2 shows those in the PCP
model. Note that the elasticity of substitution across goods ε is calibrated to
11 following Ferrero’s [8] calibrated parameter value, because the elasticity of
substitution across goods only appears in the optimality condition and cannot
be estimated because this elasticity does not appear in the estimated LCP and
PCP models. Figures 1 and 2 depict posterior means (solid lines) and pointwise
90% posterior probability intervals (dotted lines) for the impulse responses to
one-standard-deviation shocks in the percentage deviation from the steady state.
Macroeconomic volatilities that are evaluated at the posterior mean parameters
are shown in Table 4.11
Under PCP, the PPI inﬂation rate in countries H and F is more stabilized
than the CPI inﬂation rate in countries H and F ( p a n e l s3t o6i nF i g u r e
2). This result is consistent with Gali and Monacelli [12], who imply that PPI
inﬂation targeting produces a zero output gap. This result can be understood
by paying attention to Eq. (47). Although this setting does not correspond to
our estimation result, we have NKPC in the PCP model under a special case
by substituting σ = η = 1 into Eq. (47) as follows:




This NKPC implies that stabilizing PPI inﬂation stabilizes the output gap si-
multaneously, and is consistent with the one derived by Gali and Monacelli
[12], although the slope of our NKPC is slightly diﬀerent from theirs because
11As shown in the optimality conditions in Eqs. (53), (54) and (55), the LCP and PCP
models are not aﬀected by ζt and ζ∗
t .O n l yξt and ξ∗
t aﬀe c tt h eL C Pa n dP C Pm o d e l su n d e r
optimal monetary policy.
23we assume a two-country economy. Because the special case σ = η =1d o e s
not correspond to our posterior result, the PPI inﬂation rate is not completely
stabilized and ﬂuctuates slightly, and the volatilities in the PPI inﬂation rate
in countries H and F are 3.65E-05 and 2.01E-05 to changes in productivity in
countries H and F, respectively (the seventh and eighth rows in Table 4).12
Needless to say, the nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuates in the PCP model (the
17th row in Table 4 and panel 13 in Figure 2). This fact implies that a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime is the optimal regime under PCP.
Under LCP, CPI inﬂation rather than PPI inﬂation is completely stabilized,
a n dt h i sr e s u l ti sd i ﬀerent from Gali and Monacelli [12] (the ninth and 10th
rows in Table 4 and panels 3 and 4 in Figure 1). This can be understood by
examining Eq. (35), which can be rewritten as:
πt = βEt (πt+1)+καxW
t .
This equality implies that CPI inﬂation is zero when the average output gap is
stabilized. In fact, the volatility of the average output gap xW
t is zero, as shown
in the third row in Table 4. In addition, the ﬁf t ha n ds i x t hr o w si nT a b l e4a n d
panels 1 and 2 in Figure 1 show that volatilities and ﬂuctuations in the output
gap in countries H and F are symmetric. This suggests that the average output
gap is zero because xW
t = 1
2 (xt + x∗
t). Interestingly, the nominal exchange rate
is completely stabilized under LCP, as shown in the 17th row in Table 4 and
the 13th panel in Figure 1. As mentioned in Section 2.1.3, PPP always holds,
even if LCP is assumed. Hence, et +p∗
t = pt holds. Perfect stabilization in CPI
inﬂation implies pt = p∗
t = 0, which is consistent with et = 0. Thus, under
LCP, there are neither changes in CPI inﬂation nor in the nominal exchange
rate. This is consistent with Devereux and Engel [5], who develop an NOEM
model assuming LCP and showing that a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t ei sa no p t i m a l
regime from the viewpoint of maximizing welfare. Our result that there are
no ﬂuctuations in the nominal exchange rate stems from stabilizing the CPI
inﬂation rate. Perfect stabilization in CPI inﬂation is consistent with perfect
stabilization in the CPI level.13 Thus, it can be said that our result is consistent
with Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [3], who show that CPI stabilization is optimal.
We now reconcile Devereux and Engel’s [5] main ﬁnding with Corsetti, Dedola
and Leduc’s [3] main ﬁnding, although Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [3] point out
that there is a strong tradeoﬀ in stabilization between the nominal exchange
rate and the CPI. Perfect stabilization in CPI inﬂation is not inconsistent with
perfect stabilization in the nominal exchange rate.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We analyzed optimal monetary policy in an LCP model by comparing it with
a PCP model, and produced two main ﬁndings, as follows. Optimal monetary
12In the special case, balanced trade is attained and the foreign output gap does not aﬀect
domestic inﬂation under PCP. However, in the general case σ < 1a n dη 6=1 ,w h i c hi s
consistent with our estimation result, the foreign output gap aﬀects domestic inﬂation, as
shown in Eq. (47). Hence, a tradeoﬀ between PPI inﬂation and the output gap cannot be
completely dissolved even if optimal monetary policy is conducted. See Benigno and Benigno
[2] for details.
13We assume a zero inﬂation deterministic steady state.
24policy under LCP produces no ﬂuctuations in the CPI inﬂation rate. Roughly
speaking, optimal monetary policy under LCP is CPI inﬂation targeting. This
result is quite diﬀerent from the result in Gali and Monacelli [12] who show
that stabilizing in the PPI inﬂation is optimal. We also showed that there are
no ﬂuctuations in the nominal exchange rate under LCP. Roughly speaking,
optimal monetary policy under LCP is consistent with a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime, as showed by Devereux and Engel [5]. We reconciled our results with
Devereux and Engel [5], and derived policy implications that were consistent
with Woodford’s [33] motivation.
Our policy implication for LCP is important, because our estimation results
based on Japanese and US data strongly support the LCP model. Regarding
our empirical and theoretical results, it can be said that central banks, not only
in Japan and the US, but also in other countries where LCP is dominant, should
pursue monetary policy that stabilizes the CPI inﬂation rate from the viewpoint
of minimizing welfare costs.
Our ﬁnding sheds light on Mussa’s puzzle, which focuses on the comovement
of the nominal exchange rate and real exchange rate, as in Betts and Devereux
[4]. Because complete stabilization in the CPI inﬂation rate coincides with
complete stabilization in the nominal exchange rate under LCP, one of the
answers to Mussa’s puzzle may be optimal monetary policy under LCP. Solving
Mussa’s puzzle along with the result in this paper remains an objective for future
research.
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27Table 1: Prior distributions of parameters
Parameter Distribution Mean S.D.
σ Normal 3 1
η Normal 4.5 1
ϕ Normal 3 1
θ Beta 0.75 0.05
% Beta 0.8 0.1
%∗ Beta 0.8 0.1
φ Normal 1.7 0.1
φ∗ Normal 1.7 0.1
φx Normal 0.125 0.05
φ∗
x Normal 0.125 0.05
ρ Beta 0.85 0.1
ρ∗ Beta 0.85 0.1
ρm Beta 0.85 0.1
ρ∗
m Beta 0.85 0.1
σξ Inv. Gamma 0.4 2
σ∗
ξ Inv. Gamma 0.4 2
σζ Inv. Gamma 0.1 2
σ∗
ζ Inv. Gamma 0.1 2
28Table 2: Posterior distributions of parameters
L C Pm o d e l P C PM o d e l
Parameter Mean 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval
σ 4.440 [3.159, 5.688] 2.518 [1.759, 3.260]
η 4.526 [2.923, 6.148] 8.174 [6.939, 9.485]
ϕ 2.389 [0.820, 3.875] 5.737 [4.525, 6.941]
θ 0.910 [0.888, 0.931] 0.909 [0.891, 0.926]
% 0.647 [0.523, 0.775] 0.321 [0.209, 0.430]
%∗ 0.539 [0.406, 0.658] 0.339 [0.238, 0.440]
φ 1.264 [1.064, 1.410] 1.582 [1.409, 1.760]
φ∗ 1.673 [1.507, 1.823] 1.574 [1.396, 1.750]
φx 0.257 [0.189, 0.323] 0.212 [0.138, 0.284]
φ∗
x 0.087 [0.041, 0.135] 0.170 [0.097, 0.241]
ρ 0.714 [0.556, 0.888] 0.440 [0.358, 0.528]
ρ∗ 0.662 [0.581, 0.741] 0.735 [0.674, 0.794]
ρm 0.845 [0.748, 0.956] 0.994 [0.989, 1.000]
ρ∗
m 0.998 [0.996, 0.999] 0.993 [0.988, 0.999]
σξ 0.352 [0.091, 0.681] 1.264 [1.083, 1.456]
σ∗
ξ 4.719 [1.568, 7.985] 0.687 [0.541, 0.843]
σζ 0.069 [0.041, 0.095] 0.214 [0.139, 0.289]
σ∗
ζ 0.201 [0.135, 0.271] 0.213 [0.139, 0.286]
Table 3: Model comparison with Bayes factors






29Table 4: Macroeconomic volatility to a one-s.d. increase in productivity





t 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
πW
t 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
xt 0.00091 0.01340 0.00066 0.00036
x∗
t 0.00091 0.01340 0.00066 0.00036
πP,t 0.00045 0.00586 3.65E-05 2.01E-05
π∗
P,t 0.00045 0.00586 3.65E-05 2.01E-05
πt 0.00000 0.00000 0.00092 0.00050
π∗
t 0.00000 0.00000 0.00092 0.00050
ˆ rt 0.00162 0.02177 0.00833 0.00200
ˆ r∗
t 0.00162 0.02177 0.00753 0.00217
yt 0.00399 0.01604 0.01326 0.00097
y∗
t 0.00131 0.04604 0.00176 0.00725
st 0.00121 0.01435 0.00185 0.00101
zt 0.00000 0.00000 0.00013 6.89E-05
et 0.00000 0.00000 0.00175 0.00096
30Figure 1: IRFs to productivity shocks in country H in the LCP model
31Figure 2: IRFs to productivity shocks in country H in the PCP model
32